Tensions hung thick in the air as the summer of 1876 descended on the coastal rice plantations of Lowcountry South Carolina. In an area that had been synonymous, before the American Civil War, with the state's confident, ostentatious planter aristocracy, and whose staples of rice and Ã I completed the early research for this article during my tenure as Walter Hines Page Fellow at the National Humanities Center in [2003] [2004] and wish to acknowledge the generous support of the NHC and its staff. Thanks are also due to the British Academy, which funded the archival research required for this work, and to Stephen Tuck, who arranged an opportunity to present a preliminary draft to the American History Research Seminar at Oxford University. I am especially grateful to Jennifer Kelly and Dave Brannigan, who chased down some of the loose research threads from across the Atlantic, and to those scholars who offered critical comments on an earlier draft: Bruce Baker, William McKee Evans, Harold S. Forsythe, Suzanne Cameron Linder Hurley, Susan O'Donovan, Stephen Kantrowitz, Nancy MacLean, David Montgomery, James Tuten and the anonymous readers at IRSH. long-staple cotton had been transformed into the colossal wealth upon which the slave-power citadel of Charleston had been built, destitution was on the march. From Colleton County, nestled along the Atlantic between the Edisto and Combahee rivers, reports emerged that more than 700 people were literally ''without bread''. '' [T] he wolf is at the door'', one distressed resident proclaimed in an appeal for relief. ''There are [:::] a large number of [people] who [:::] will absolutely starve if help cannot be obtained. '' 1 Further south in Beaufort County, the New York Sun noted, the ''wan, haggard faces of those who know not where the next meal will be procured greet the stranger at every turn'', with many able to keep starvation at bay only by ''subsisting on wild fruits, the only food free to the utterly destitute''. Across the Savannah River, where the Lowcountry extended into Georgia and where similar conditions would, in coming months, produce a lethal yellow-fever epidemic among the ''poorer classes'', journalists warned about the ''famine-bred disposition to plunder'' evident in a recent surge in murder and theft. 2 Conflicting reports emerged about the extent of such misery among local whites, but there can be little doubt that deprivation was most acutely concentrated among the Lowcountry's black rice-plantation workforce, whose wages, one observer admitted, were ''barely sufficient for support''. Some local planters took umbrage at the insinuation that hunger was making inroads among whites, boycotting the relief campaign out of resentment that a disproportionate share of their charity would be disbursed among the ex-slave population. ''As for starving'', a piqued Adams Run correspondent asserted, ''there is no danger of any thing of that kind''. While acknowledging that ''colored people'' on ''some [:::] plantations may be hard up on account of the planters not hiring as much day labor as heretofore'', the writer insisted -in a sneering ''hint for the colored folk'' -that it was not the white, conservative readership of the Charleston News and Courier, but instead the ''colored people of Charleston'' who should be busy organizing meetings to ''[help] their brethren''. The assertion in this and subsequent correspondence that it was mainly African Americans who were suffering from hunger was rejected in a report published just over a month later. In response to a query about ''whether the whites can crowd in among the negroes to get their share'', a correspondent familiar with the relief work assured readers that it was ''the destitution among the whites [that] induced the action for relief'', and provided a striking affirmation that the work was being organized in such a way as to avoid tampering with the racial status quo. With the relief committee firmly in the hands of local planters, ''colored people'' seeking aid, who ''generally occupy subordinate the Civil War and exacerbated by a depressed rice market and a series of seasonal, weather-related calamities presented South Carolina rice planters with a challenge that would have proved daunting under the most favorable political climate. 4 But as the summer of 1876 commenced, Lowcountry elites faced a situation that was far from favorable, and many believed that a decisive confrontation with the region's black laborers was imminent. Mounting desperation among the plantation workforce, then just a decade removed from slavery, inflamed an already explosive local contest over the meaning of free labor -one that had not yet been decisively resolved. In the months ahead this escalating local conflict intersected with a state-wide -and indeed national -confrontation between the faltering, Republican-led experiment in bi-racial democracy, in which freedpeople had vested their hopes for deliverance, and white conservatives intent on carrying through a counter-revolution that would restore the authority they had enjoyed under the antebellum regime. When, in late May, fieldhands launched the first in a wave of strikes aimed at blocking planters' attempts to offload the costs of their difficulties, both sides were drawn into the vortex of an epic confrontation whose outcome would set the parameters of racial and class politics in the United States well into the twentieth century.
This season of black laborers' discontent has been subjected to examination by a number of exceptionally gifted historians. For Eric Foner, the strikes ''epitomized in microcosm a host of issues central to the legacy of emancipation''. His definitive rendering of their significance in ''The Emancipated Worker'' remains, more than twenty years after publication, a seminal illumination of the transformative potential of the Second American Revolution and the devastating consequences of its collapse after 1876. John C. Strickland's extended reflection on moral economy and political culture among freedpeople in the Lowcountry, published just two years later, explored the ''intense social and cultural solidarity rooted in large, stable plantation communities, in the intergenerational continuity of slave families, and in the long-established practice of [planter] absenteeism''. The rice strikes figure in the most frequently cited first-hand accounts of Redemption in South Carolina and in its reconstruction by professional historians, Francis Butler Simkins, Robert H. Woody, and George B. Tindall. They continue to figure, tangentially, in some of the most compelling scholarship produced over the past quarter century. 5 Despite their prominence in the historical literature, however, the full dimensions of the strikes' significance have been obscured by the trajectory of Reconstruction historiography over the past century. While the once dominant interpretation pioneered by William A. Dunning (grounded in prevailing assumptions about black racial inferiority) has been thoroughly overturned, his fixation with race continues to shape the field, often in ways that can conceal the salience of class in white elites' determination to thwart the democratic transformation of the South. Revisionists whose scholarship exposed the shortcomings of the Dunning school from mid-century onwards reject the racist assumptions embedded in its work and, in countering the earlier bias, have devoted considerable attention to exonerating black southerners of the malicious charges of ignorance, corruption, and vice leveled against them. Where this revision has been integrated into a broader framework that situates race in a complex matrix of class, sectional, and national political and economic pressures -as W.E.B. DuBois did in his pioneering Black Reconstruction, or as Foner has more recently 6 -the result has been penetrating, illuminative social history. But elsewhere the reaction against Dunning has produced a literature with vulnerabilities of its own.
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Its distinctly celebratory tone can overstate the agency of an ex-slave community with few material or military resources at its disposal, locked into a fearsome contest with powerful, determined, and well-armed opponents and only conditionally supported by unsteady Northern allies. Its inclination to project a unified black community, and to uphold the legislative accomplishments of black elected officials, conceals the substantial disparities -in literacy and educational background, wealth and previous status, gender, and even color -distinguishing the mass of propertyless ex-slaves from the ''representative men of the race'' elected to plead their cause. One of the primary aims of this article is to demonstrate the problems in foisting such an interpretive framework on the ex-slave community, but its deficiencies for analyzing their adversaries are equally debilitating. A narrow focus on the intense racial antipathy suffusing the rhetoric of counter-revolution in the South tends to reduce what was a profound social confrontation into a mere clash over competing racial identities, and to reduce the intensely class-conscious worldview animating propertied Southern conservatives to ''white supremacy'', or plainly racial motivations. Such a restricted approach underestimates the stakes involved in Reconstruction and obscures the ''complex interpenetration of racial, class, and social conflict'' that characterized this tumultuous period.
8
Like the rice swamps out of which they developed, the 1876 strikes offer fertile ground for revisiting the most compelling issues raised in Reconstruction historiography. They expose, as few events do, the sharp tensions between the African-American, working-class constituency that provided the Republican party with its only dependable Southern constituency and that party's vacillating, mostly (but not exclusively) white, bourgeois leadership. In her important recent study, Heather Cox Richardson has made the case that Northern Republican elites were driven to ''abandon the mid-century vision of an egalitarian free labor society'' by assertive freedpeople oblivious to the ''mutual interests'' that ostensibly bound them and their employers. But her thesis rests almost entirely on Northern published opinion rather than the actual record of conflict in the South.
9
Among those who have analyzed the relationship between southern Republican officials and their black constituency, the picture is more complicated: few would dispute that African-American laborers succeeded, to some extent, in adapting party institutions at the grassroots level to their own requirements, 10 In hindsight, it appears wholly predictable that a seemingly straightforward labor dispute between ex-slaves and their former masters would become thoroughly entangled with the political crisis that ushered in the overthrow of Reconstruction. White South Carolinian elites had provided the intellectual leadership for the secessionist vanguard in the run-up to Civil War and a disproportionate share of the Confederacy's military cadre once battle was joined. They were constitutionally unreceptive to the notion of black political participation, let alone equality, and registered their unyielding opposition to the state's Reconstruction government from the outset.
12 Close scrutiny of their attitudes to the new Republican-led government, however, suggests that elite hostility was based not merely on a perceived affront to white racial sensibilities, but on resentment over the disruption of their authority as employers that emancipation had introduced. 13 Mastery over their overwhelmingly black workforce seemed to white elites inextricably bound up with the maintenance, or restoration, of racial supremacy.
14 Acutely nostalgic for the unambiguous social hierarchy that slavery had made possible, Southern planters were profoundly disoriented in their new free labor surroundings, vexed by the war of position they were now compelled to engage in with emancipated fieldhands. ''The difficulties seem to thicken around us'', a disconsolate Ralph Middleton declared in 1870, ''The fact is, there is a continuous struggle [underway] where the planter is all the time at a great disadvantage.'' Blaming his woes in part on the distinctly post-emancipation phenomenon of labor scarcity, the Georgetown rice planter complained that ''[t]he negroes do pretty much as they please [,] and laugh at threats of dismissal as there are any number of places where they can go''. His frustrations were echoed by the Georgia Agricultural Commissioner, who would later reflect that the war had left ''labor [:::] in a disorganized and chaotic state'', and the planters' ''power to compel the laborers to go into the rice-swamps utterly broken''. 15 Like many of his peers, 16 Middleton attempted, through an exasperating process of trial and error, to come to terms with the new free labor arrangements. For several years he held out hope that the solution to his woes lay in the imposition of a wages system with strict deductions for time missed, but this his fieldhands resisted in favor of the relative 14. Holden observes that the mid-1870s witnessed a new convergence between ''the traditionally antidemocratic views of South Carolina's ruling elite'', and ''growing national doubts about majoritarian rule'', a sensibility that included, but was not limited to, notions of black exclusion from the body politic on grounds of racial inferiority. Holden, ''The Public Business is Ours'', p. 52. Wade Hampton's strategy in the 1876 campaign suggested that some conservative white elites had reconciled themselves to limited black participation in government so long as that did not intrude on their class prerogatives. This racial accommodation was the source of divisions between straight-out militant Martin W. Gary and Hampton, and would later become an important flashpoint in the confrontation between the Tillman movement and traditional conservative elites in the 1880s. independence they might secure through renting shares of land or working according to the established task system. When pressed to explain why he was unable to match ''old-time'' harvests on his uncle's rice plantation, Middleton retorted that in order to do so he would require ''the old-time facilities of labor''. Despairing that the ''negroes are steadily more and more averse to hard work'', he inquired of his uncle whether he ''would not like to import [:::] 100 or so Chinamen'' to replace blacks at Georgetown and Beaufort. Complaining later of the ''incorrigible laziness of the negro'', Middleton noted that fieldhands refused outright to work in the rain or undertake the backbreaking ''ditching work'', a dilemma that compelled his peers in Georgia to employ gangs of Irishmen in their place, among whom, they noted favorably, ''there is no talking, as with negroes, no trifling, but the work goes on rapidly and in a serious manner''.
17
Planters accurately discerned the decline of their authority in the proliferation of petty infractions like ''trifling'' and ''talking'', but expressed their greatest resentment against the intensely political conversation that emancipation had touched off among black laborers. The proliferation of grassroots organizing by the Republican party (or perhaps the emergence of previously established, underground networks into above-ground, party institutions like the Union Leagues 18 ) after the war had transformed black South Carolinians into ''the most irrepressible democrats it is possible to conceive'', Florence planter Belton O'Neal Townsend grumbled in the pages of the Atlantic Monthly, with deleterious consequences for whites' ability to maintain discipline in the fields. Freedmen had proven themselves ''totally unreliable'' in the three growing seasons since emancipation, an up-country planter wrote in September 1867, ''and since this political element has been introduced among them, they are utterly worthless''. Ralph Middleton complained, similarly, that the freedmen's ''heads are full of politics, and they have no idea of work until starvation forces them'', blaming his troubles at Georgetown on ''two or three miserable Yankee negro politicians' '. 19 This excess of democracy was evident to low-country rice planters in the ''extensive strike'' their laborers inaugurated in late May, encompassing at the outset at least 10 plantations along the Combahee River and putting at risk more than 4,000 acres of rice. 20 The strike seems to have been initiated not by regular fieldhands, but by the ''special day laborers'', casual workers -disproportionately female -who lived inland from the heavily cultivated riverbanks and hired themselves out at harvest time, and upon whom the planters first attempted to impose a reduction in wages from 50 to 40 cents a day. 21 Striking laborers dispatched a committee that offered to terminate their action if the reduction was withdrawn, but when planters rejected a settlement, they energetically set about extending the strike. Almost overnight, the conflict spread north to plantations along the Ashepoo River and expanded to take up grievances of the regular workforce, including their unwillingness to work for ''cat's wages'' and resentment against payment in ''checks'' or ''scrip'' redeemable (up to two years' distant) at plantation stores. 22 The strike would continue intermittently for nearly four months, defying resolution until by late October local planters -militant ''states'-rights'' Democrats almost to a man -were petitioning the Republican Governor with requests that he dispatch federal troops to suppress it. 23 The rapid escalation of the May strikes attests to the polarization gripping the Lowcountry in the summer of 1876, but it also underscores the willingness of the freed community to rally behind its most vulnerable members -female casual laborers. Fieldhands organized under the plain but powerful designation of ''the majority'' 24 adopted the extremely rule among themselves to not allow any man to work at the reduced wages on the riceplantations; that a majority of them were in favor of that, and they thought a majority ought to rule. They seemed to be honest in it that a majority should rule. told the News and Courier that a band of fifty-three strikers visited his property in late May and had ''quite a parade''. ''After speaking and the like'', he reported, ''every one of the men there joined them and went to a neighboring place, where they committed acts of violence such as has not been witnessed since the days of Sherman's marches''. Ten were ''severely flogged'', according to this suspect rendering, before the strikers crossed the Combahee and allegedly whipped another thirty.
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Planters and their sympathizers in the Democratic press attempted, from the outset of the strikes, to cast them as electioneering stunts, in which Republican operatives manipulated the ostensibly ignorant mass of fieldhands into striking over imaginary grievances. Local elites were convinced that, having been denied the civilizing influence of substantial contact with whites, Lowcountry blacks were exceptionally credulous and therefore susceptible to being used as pawns by scheming politicians.
26
With a critical election looming, conservatives suspected the strike was ''a device of the radical leaders to create an excitement, and to cause dissensions between the races in order to wield the colored vote into a solid mass''. It had been a ''part of the radical programme to assist their cause in the Autumnal elections'', one planter suggested, ''to make [the Lowcountry laborers] believe they were not sufficiently paid for their In testimony some months following the strike, verbal confrontation on this point developed between a local Republican official and a Democratic lawyer determined to prove the special ignorance of the ''Combahee crowd''. ''Of what class of people as to intelligence?'' were the strikers, the lawyer inquired, to which the Colleton county auditor, W.A. Paul, responded, ''about as intelligent as the people generally be in this section of the country''. The exchange continued: Q. What is the character of the people of this section as to intelligence? A. Very good for an uneducated people. Q. They are then uneducated and ignorant? A. I will say that they are uneducated, but cannot say that they are all ignorant. Q. Why cannot you speak as well to the one as to the other? A. Because I find that we meet with men every day of our lives that are men with sound judgments; therefore I cannot say a man is entirely ignorant that is deprived of an education. day's labor''. Politics was ''largely mixed with their harangues and proceedings'', a News and Courier correspondent observed at the initiation of the strike, and the planter's vulnerability at harvest time ''seized upon by a few bad, designing, factious leaders'' who led the ''discontented'' on their ''march'' through the rice district. The Savannah Morning News went further, asserting that the strike had been the work of ''but a few maliciously disposed negroes, who were [:::] paid by radical leaders to create disturbances for the good of their party''. One implausible report even suggested that the whippings had been carried ''by outside parties and not those engaged in rice cultivation ''. 27 Attempts to cast the disturbances in a conspiratorial mould may have helped to galvanize conservative resistance, but as a guide for defusing black Lowcountry discontent they were counterproductive. The conservative press, which only days before the May outbreak had acknowledged the intense hardship facing freedpeople, dramatically reversed itself as soon as the objects of their sympathy took matters into their own hands. Under the difficult circumstances facing planters, ''the attempt on the part of the hands to advance the wages is without any ground of reason or justice'', the Journal of Commerce now suggested. Ashepoo planter, David McPherson, informing Governor Daniel Chamberlain that his laborers were ''abundantly supplied with the comforts of life'', insisted that the situation required ''an immediate stop [:::] to any further raiding'', and the arrest and punishment of ''leaders [:::] for offenses committed on harmless people''. The otherwise astute Republican Attorney General, William Stone, who considered the disturbances on the Combahee ''very serious'', attempted to convince Chamberlain that by the ''arrest of three or four ringleaders'' the strike could be ''broken up'', a simplistic approach (later revised) which mirrored that of the propertied Lowcountry conservatives then in regular communication with Stone's office. 28 Clearly there was something unfathomable for conservatives in the powerful mobilizations rolling out across the Lowcountry. One early commentator depicted the strikers as completely unaware of the wider import of their actions. ''Distance lends enchantment'', ''R.M.D.'' suggested in the News and courier in late May, ''and this matter creates more interest in Charleston than at the scene of the troubles. Here the blacks do not appreciate the trouble they are making.'' Such a view may have acted as a corrective on the tendency of local whites to cast the most parochial affairs in epochal terms, but it suggests also that their complacency led whites to underestimate the strikers' astute grasp of the drift of state and national politics. 29 Given the low levels of literacy among black workers, the transmission of information about developments beyond the rice district relied on an overwhelmingly oral culture, which emanated from local churches, secret societies, and Republican-led mass meetings. Steven Hahn's point about the crucial role that clandestine networks constructed under slavery played in black working-class politics during Reconstruction is clearly born out in the Lowcountry. 30 One sympathetic wartime journalist, struck by the familiarity he observed between two slaves who had never previously met (a teamster who had been assigned to transport him into the state's interior, and another dispatched to retrieve him en route), was told, upon inquiring whether there was ''some secret understanding between you [two]'', that ''all the bracks [sic] am freemasons''. ''I gabe Jim de grip; dat tole him'', his driver disclosed, but protested, when pressed further, that he ''can't say no more [as] I SHUD BREAK DE OATH EF I DID''. The traveler came away from the episode convinced that ''there exists among the blacks a secret and widespread organization of a Masonic character, having its grip, pass-word, and oath'', with ''competent and earnest men'' as leaders 31 (emphasis, capitalization in original). Such networks, which predated formal organization under the Republican banner, could be remarkably effective in keeping fieldhands abreast of developments. A Freedmen's Bureau agent observing an earlier confrontation over wages was struck by ''how unanimous [the rice-district laborers] are, communicating like magic, and now holding out, knowing the importance of every day in regard to the welfare of the next crop''. tradition and the critical role played by such networks in galvanizing freedpeople. The meeting was launched with a ''song composed in the rice fields, with the chorus 'all that we want is the green backs''', and ''sung [with the] indescribable enthusiasm for which rice fieldhands have long been noted''. Strikers had been incited early on by their ''excitement'' over the menacing, white supremacist revision of the traditional religious hymn, ''A Charge to Keep I Have'', that had appeared in the News and Courier, and which contained a pledge to ''make [the black laborer] know his place''. 33 The strikers knew the song ''by heart'', one reporter observed, and were aware too that it had been ''sung by the Democrats of [Mississippi]''. One laborer remarked that he had been unable to ''understand at all what the [strike] trouble was about'' until he heard the song, ''and then he knowed all about it''. It must be remembered, too, that the same networks that disseminated news from one plantation to another could also carry news out of the rice district. When Charleston blacks took command of the city's main streets during rioting in early September, they reportedly chanted, ''We lick the whites on Combahee/And teck the city on next day./D-o-w-n with the white man''. In that confrontation, conservatives commented on the ''prompt appearance, full preparation, and apparently good organization of the negroes'', and the Charleston ''mob'' was reported to have held ''boats [:::] in readiness to notify the negroes on the islands and to obtain reinforcements''.
34
Elitist assumptions about the absence of initiative or political capacity among the illiterate mass of freedmen and women blinded planters to the very deep resonance that the strikes elicited among their workforce. To be sure, labor militancy over the coming months was neither completely spontaneous nor leaderless. But such leaders as emerged derived their authority at the grassroots level, and seemed willing, at critical junctures, to act independently of the local Republican apparatus. This raises the intriguing question of the extent to which the public face of Lowcountry Republicanism overlapped with grassroots and underground freedpeople's leadership, a question for which the sources provide no definitive answer. In any case, the strike leaders' relationship to rank-and-file fieldhands had 33. ''To serve the present age/Our pockets we must fill./We'll make them work for wages now/ And never pay the bill. been forged in ''labor unions'', 35 clubs, and secret societies -''conclaves'' as one hostile account referred to them -which were for the most part impermeable to white scrutiny. In a rare acknowledgment that reports of whipping had been exaggerated (strikers referred to it as ''a little brushing off'' 36 ), one observer reported from Colleton that ''the strikes seem to have been conducted with order and discipline, as if controlled by some skillful leaders as yet unknown''. ''[T]he colored people'', he elaborated, ''with the secretiveness which so largely exists [among them], profess to know nothing when questioned'', while the ''white planters, being in direct antagonism with the laborers [:::] are of course unable to give any authoritative facts concerning the motives and acts of their [employees]''. But the cause of the unrest was straightforward, a twenty-six year-old fieldhand asserted: the strike, brought on by ''hunger'', had simply provided workers with a rare opportunity to ''halloo out loud'' their otherwise ''secret groanings''.
37
This initial confrontation in late May subsided fairly quickly, and planters comforted themselves, fleetingly, with the illusion that matters had been brought to a resolution. But the context in which the walkouts had erupted grew more polarized as the autumn elections approached, and the rice district would be convulsed by chronic, rolling strikes for much of the summer. The fusion of political concerns and economic grievances in Lowcountry militancy was evident from the outset, although not in the constricted, electioneering form conservatives depicted. Both white conservatives and black radicals had been aroused by events in Mississippi the previous year where, through a combination of orchestrated paramilitary violence and systematic fraud, Democrats had managed to overthrow Republican rule. 38 White Mississippians' triumph ''put new thought and heart'' into their South Carolina counterparts, allowing conservatives to imagine a scenario where they might ''by any and every means and at any cost of life and money'' shake off Republican rule and reestablish control over the black laboring population. Freedpeople understood that these were the stakes in the looming election, and among them apocalyptic fears about the possibility of conservative restoration fueled a desperate, uncompromising militancy.
39
Although one or two planters seemed to have attempted a reasonable settlement early on, the rollcall of those engaged in confrontation with the strikers reads like a Who's Who of the Lowcountry Democratic establishment, among whom there existed little sentiment for compromise. One veteran of the 1876 campaign recalled Colleton as ''probably the most fiercely determined county of the state'', which had a ''large number of high spirited, hot blooded young men of old and once wealthy families'' determined to resist ''degradation in continuance of Republican and Negro rule''. The county was in ''a blaze of excitement'', planter John Larescey later testified, recalling that he ''did not know of a single white man in that whole county but what was a Democrat''. J. Bennett Bissell, upon whose Combahee property the dispute over payment in scrip first erupted, was certainly one of those who, ''by the restless, reckless energy of desperation, the strong hand and reputations [:::] of being very dangerous when pushed too far'', insisted on crushing the strike at all cost. The largest rice planter in the district, he was prominently linked to white paramilitaries and to the planters' hard-line policy, making incessant demands upon Chamberlain and his Attorney General to break the strike forcefully. ''Captain'' Robert Fishburne had ''suppressed'' the strike on his plantation ''vi et armis'', by taking the strikers' ''rifles and [:::] by [running] them into the river''. Much of his extended family was involved, at the center of the strike and in the campaign to deliver a Democratic majority in Colleton, 40 as were ''Colonel'' Alan C. Izard and James B. Heyward. Their involvement in the strike was driven by a shared determination that a ''straight-out'' Democratic victory -the triumph of an undiluted conservative ticketwas not only desirable but eminently achievable. 41 Previously, even the most stalwart conservatives recognized that the black electoral majority in South Carolina compelled them to seek fusion with the least objectionable Republican candidates, and as late as mid-June, staunch Democrats remained determined to avoid ''the ruinous consequences of straight-outism''. Writing from Colleton, ''Rusticus'' reminded those who had ''urged that it is best [:::] to run a strictly Democratic ticket'' that the ''[c]olored vote in this county stands almost two to one as compared with the white''. Whatever merits the straight-out ticket might hold elsewhere in the state, he insisted, in Colleton ''we would not ask any man to even lose a day's work to go to the polls to vote [the] ticket if it is to be straight Democratic''. The black voter ''will not [:::] desert his party [and] become a Democrat'', Rusticus cautioned, ''and to force that matter is to lose his cooperation altogether''. Better to reach a pragmatic compromise, he suggested, than to throw all away on an unlikely straight-out breakthrough. This pragmatic position was endorsed by the voice of Democratic respectability, the News and Courier, which reasoned that ''the fight is lost as soon as a straight-out ticket is nominated''. The policy delivered victory only in those ''counties which can [:::] be carried by the Democrats without a 'straight-out' [:::] ticket'', but surrendered any possible gains ''in counties where the negroes are in the majority, leaving those counties at the mercy of the extreme Radicals''.
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Conservative opponents of the straight-out policy were buoyed in their optimism by the series of compromises and outright reversals of radical policy wrung from Republican Governor Daniel Chamberlain. From the beginning of his administration in 1874 Chamberlain had won the support of prominent conservatives, and of Charleston's commercial elite in particular, 43 by his campaign against the alleged ''excesses'' perpetrated by his own party. Responding to an outcry among propertied whites over the tax increases required to fund an expanded state role in the welfare of its most hard-pressed citizens, Chamberlain had embarked on a program of fiscal retrenchment that delighted moderate elements in the Democratic party but left ''[n]egro leaders [:::] struggling, sometimes unsuccessfully, to defeat the socially reactionary legislative initiatives of their own'' elected Governor. 44 ''It is sometimes thought'', editors at the News and Courier acknowledged, ''that Charleston is inclined to be over-cautious''. The explanation for this lay in the city's role as a dispenser of Northern capital to the planting interests, they reasoned, and ''when Charleston urges, as she does, that politics be treated as a matter of business, not as a sentiment, and that extreme policies and measures be rejected, the sole object is to maintain confidence in the stability of our industries [:::]. Audacity suits those who have nothing to lose'', they wrote, ''better than it suits those who pay a fifth, at least, of the whole of the State taxes.'' See ''Charleston Conservatism'', the Republican Governor in the upcoming elections. ''With the same sincerity'' with which it had opposed him two years previously, the paper now endorsed Chamberlain, advising Democrats ''to make no opposition to his re-election''. White conservatives had made substantial gains over the previous two years, editors acknowledged, but ''their strength would have availed us nothing had Governor Chamberlain been what we feared he would be, and what the Radical[s] expected him to be''. 45 This policy of cooperation seemed to some prominent Democrats vindicated during the May strike wave. Although he publicly expressed sympathy ''with all who are struggling for a bare subsistence'', Chamberlain admonished strikers to avoid interfering with strike-breakers, declaring that it was ''wrong to trouble any man who is willing to work, no matter how low the wages''. In response to a direct request from leading planter, J. Bennett Bissell, Chamberlain appointed R.H. Colcock as trial justice in Colleton, an appointment that the News and Courier heartily supported, but which outraged Republicans in the rice district, who charged that Colcock ''had no interest in the laborers, and would do whatever the planters told him to do''. He resisted appeals for the removal of a second trial justice identified by Beaufort's leading black Republican, Robert Smalls, as ''a large planter [:::] who issues checks to his laborers'', but was less obliging to planter demands for ''severe application of the law'', hopeful for now that he could defuse the crisis without completely alienating a constituency whose support he would desperately require at election time, and who were already deeply skeptical about the course he had set for the Republican party. Overall, however, his efforts to ''facilitate a settlement and to quiet the troubles'' in the low country were ''favorably spoken of'' among prominent Democrats. , 1988) , pp. 543-544. ''Chamberlain's attempt to create a new party alignment of whites and conservative Negroes'', Thomas Holt argues, ''contributed directly to the dismantling of South Carolina Republicanism''; Holt, Black Over White, p. 4. James S. Allen concurs, arguing that Chamberlain proved ''extremely conciliatory under the pressure of the Right. He appointed a number of Conservatives as judges, disbanded the Negro militia in a county where it was most needed, alleviated taxes against the large planters and, in general, started the work which the counter-revolution finished in 1876''; James S. Allen, Reconstruction: the Battle for Democracy (New York, 1937) A second wave of strikes erupted in mid-August under completely altered circumstances. The massacre of scores of black militia men and civilians by white paramilitaries at Hamburg on 8 July polarized the state to such a degree that many considered civil war inevitable, 47 and in this charged context straight-outs gained the upper hand within Democratic ranks, effectively silencing the cooperationist wing of the party and nominating a ticket headed by former Confederate general, Wade Hampton, the state's wealthiest planter and the embodiment of its paternalist antebellum aristocracy. In the state's interior, where whites enjoyed a demographic advantage, conservatives were confident that by implementing the ''Mississippi plan'' and intimidating blacks into either voting the Democratic ticket or staying away from the polls, they could ''redeem'' the state, and their confidence began to infect the Lowcountry. In Charleston the News and Courier had endured the derision of its straight-out rivals 48 and fought Chamberlain's corner, endorsing his candidacy as late as 7 July, but Hamburg brought all of this to an end. Among leading Lowcountry planters, the straight-outs appear to have had the upper hand from the very beginning, and the new turn in state politics reinforced their determination to confront the radicals in their Lowcountry stronghold. Deeply offended at the challenge to their prerogative manifested in the strike and amenable, even eager for a repressive solution to their predicament, Lowcountry elites braced themselves for a campaign aimed at delivering labor peace and restoring the ''natural ruling element'' to power across the state. Intransigence was not confined to conservatives in the wake of the Hamburg atrocity, however. The Lowcountry's highly politicized black Republican constituency, freshly confident in the wake of their success in the May strikes 50 and deeply stirred by the events at Hamburg, were in no mood to allow conservatives to recapture state power. Their growing disaffection with Chamberlain's strategy of compromise added to their anxious militancy: freedpeople across the state now blamed the Governor for allowing the conservatives to regain their footing. At the state Republican convention in Orangeburg, reporters found it ''a matter of deep astonishment to see the deep-seated opposition to Chamberlain among the negroes of this county, as well as Barnwell, Colleton, and the upper part of Beaufort''. Chamberlain was reported to have been ''so persistently interrupted by his own party'' that he stormed out of the convention ''in a fit of disgust''. Similarly, a meeting of Republicans at Barnwell turned down a resolution endorsing Chamberlain's candidacy, and observers noted that the attempt ''did not take well with the negroes''.
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With their large, assertive black majorities, Beaufort and Colleton counties constituted the epicenter of anti-Chamberlain sentiment in the 1876 campaign. The Republican constituency was internally divided, with hostility to the Governor most powerfully evident at the grassroots, among black laborers. At local level, the Governor's ''anti-corruption'' campaign had been perceived as an attack on black influence in the party, and his posture in the May strikes -particularly the appointment of Colcock at their adversaries' behest -pushed many laborers into open opposition to his candidacy. Some measure of the anomaly this had introduced in party alignment can be gleaned in correspondence sent to the Governor in August, in which a Colleton conservative assured him that ''amid some seeming opposition to yourself [here] among Republicans only; I want to assure you that [the] great majority of the Democrats will vote for you'', and that ''You will carry Colleton most respectfully.'' With white conservatives extending him their hearty support, however, Chamberlain was finding it increasingly difficult to get a hearing among Lowcountry blacks. He was forced to withdraw from a meeting in Walterboro, in the heart of the strike district, after ''colored republicans [:::] would not allow him to speak''.
53
Freedpeople across South Carolina were dejected, often outraged by the behavior of their state leadership, but with an aggressive Democratic campaign underway they found themselves in a difficult predicament. The Journal of Commerce gloated, with an astute grasp of the dilemma confronting freedpeople, that the Republican ''faithful are at a loss. They have thrown Chamberlain overboard'', editors noted, ''and are now themselves adrift''. Blacks in the upcountry, far more vulnerable to Democratic intimidation, were profoundly disoriented by the paralysis in Republican ranks. But in Beaufort and Colleton, black laborers seemed to have determined to use their leverage at the height of the rice harvest to put some manners into the Lowcountry Democracy. In this sense, the strikes that re-emerged after mid-August were indeed political strikes, in which black workers attempted to wield their power to avert a conservative restoration. 54 It is tempting, on one level, to characterize the schisms within the Republican party as racially driven, but developments in the Lowcountry during the summer of 1876 suggest that African Americans themselves were divided by the issues raised in the strikes. Although Republicans drew their southern constituency overwhelmingly from the black rural and urban working classes, the party's leadership at both state and national level was either indifferent towards or positively hostile to the emergence of a distinct labor interest among freedpeople. Faced in the South with an expectant and politically mobilized mass of former slaves anxious to realize the full promise of emancipation, and in the North with a growing and increasingly restive industrial working class, by late Reconstruction the party had ditched its prewar emphasis on the liberating aspects of free labor in favor of sermons about the mutual interests of employers and employed and admonishments against unruly workers.
55 Lack of support and even ''strong and forceful opposition'' from Republican officials had derailed black longshoremen's efforts to organize in early Reconstruction Charleston, and these anti-labor tendencies were powerfully reinforced under Chamberlain, whose revitalization of the Republican project rested explicitly on an alliance with the cream of Charleston's powerful businessoriented conservatives.
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The upper ranks of the Lowcountry party apparatus proved only slightly more hospitable to rice laborers' efforts in 1876 than their Charleston counterparts had been several years earlier. The embrace of a more coercive free-labor vision compatible with market imperatives was most evident in the record of the black Beaufort Republican, Thomas Hamilton. A state representative and a rice planter of some means, Hamilton was Chamberlain's ''champion'' in the Lowcountry and at times his solitary supporter among local Republican officials, ''dragging [the Governor's case] before every meeting and pressing his claims for a renomination''. A forceful opponent of the strike from the outset, Hamilton reminded rice-workers gathered in a mass meeting at Crooked Hill that their interests were ''identical with the owners of these plantations'', urging them to abandon the strike and steer clear of the ''hellish politicians'' urging them on, who were ''paupers themselves [:::] and too poor to tell the truth''.
Caught between the insurgency unleashed by the strike and the growing momentum of the conservative campaign, Hamilton moved ever closer to an alliance with the Lowcountry Democracy. Following the Hamburg atrocity, he submitted an open letter to the News and Courier denouncing the ''indignation meetings'' organized by party officials as ''unnecessary'' and ''dangerous''. In September he accompanied black strike-breaker Tony Koger 57 to the offices of the straight-out Journal of Commerce, which subsequently carried a sensational account of his treatment at the hands of striking rice-workers under the headline, ''Blacks Mobbing Blacks''. Hamilton's posture led increasingly to clashes with the Republican rank-and-file, who charged him with ''having sold out his race, and with trying to popularize himself with the Democrats and white folks to the disparagement of his [:::] constituents''. By the end of the strike he had ''crossed over'', abandoning the Republicans completely to join the campaign for conservative restoration. Hamilton was not alone among Lowcountry Republicans in bolting from the party once the Democracy appeared to have gained the upper hand. Black Republican, Thomas E. Miller, later claimed to have been involved in negotiations with Wade Hampton to redraw Lowcountry electoral boundaries, slicing off the interior of Beaufort County to carve out a new district ''with the objective of electing a Negro Democrat to the state Senate''. Nathaniel B. Myers, a ''well-to-do freeborn mulatto'', stepped forward to stake his claim to the seat, abandoning the Republicans in an act that ''destroyed his influence in Beaufort County''. After conservatives regained power, Hampton would attempt to make good his pledge, dividing interior Beaufort from the coast and renaming the new district Hampton County, but Myers's desertion would go unrewarded. Having rid themselves of the Republican threat, ''straight-outs'' felt under no compulsion to allow even the much-attenuated back political representation that Miller and Myers had sought, making it ''impossible for men of Myers' stamp of the Negro race'' to hold office on behalf of the Democrats. Thomas Holt argues perceptively that Hamilton, whose outlook ''prefigured the anti-labor, capitalistic, accommodationist philosophy of Booker T. Washington, abandoned the Republicans for Wade Hampton to complete the overthrow of Republican government, the last hope of justice -though perhaps a misplaced one -for those rice workers whom he addressed in the summer of 1876''; see Holt, Black Over White, p. 167. In Hamilton's case, at least, the ''disposition [evident among Lowcountry freedpeople] to be more influenced by the purely black representative than by the lighter colored politicians'' offered no assurance that their interests would be protected; see ' The gulf between Republican officials and their black working-class constituents was most apparent in the upper ranks of the party, and Hamilton's derisive comments about the ''paupers'' at grassroots level suggests some relationship between strikers and the grassroots Republican cadre, but even at the local level officials sometimes exhibited an ambivalence about the field-hands' self-activity that could rankle their constituents. The problems that this created for grassroots morale, and the difficulties it introduced into the project of mounting an alternative to Chamberlain, can best be seen in the figure of Northern-born (but Beaufort-based) Republican, William J. Whipper. The Governor's refusal to sign the commission that would have allowed Whipper to take his seat as circuit court judge won the approval of Chamberlain's Democratic admirers but provoked serious disaffection within Republican ranks. Still, the Lowcountry Republican grassroots could be forgiven for their ambivalence about the outcome of this particular party crisis. Described by his biographer as one of the ''wealthiest African Americans of the [antebellum] period'', who had, like Hamilton, plowed some of his capital into rice planting, Whipper had been dragged into court by his own fieldhands for non-payment of wages.
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The conflict of interests embodied in the figures of Hamilton and Whipper is transparent, but similar incongruities appear to have shaped the intervention even of such a Republican stalwart as Robert Smalls, the former slave who had come to national prominence when he smuggled the Confederate steamship Planter out of Charleston harbor and into Union possession during the War. Smalls, whose name would be synonymous with black Lowcountry political power until his death in 1916, played a critical role at several junctures in countering Democratic slander against the strikers, in dissuading Chamberlain from resorting to military suppression, and in defending the basic right of laborers to strike for higher wages. But like Hamilton and Myers, Smalls was affected by the pressures of the moment, and seems to have been engaged in a complicated maneuver by which he aimed to salvage an enduring public role for himself out of the impending disaster of conservative restoration. was sent there by the 'rebels' or 'Democrats''', two of Elliott's associates explained to Attorney General, William Stone. ''But the political leaders who are known can have great influence and can probably at once stop the troubles.'' Both expressed themselves as ''under great obligation'' to Smalls for his role in dispersing the strikers at Ballouville. But the strikers were not so pleased: they were reported to have warned that ''if the said Robert Smalls attempted to interfere with them [:::] they would tie him up and give him 150 lashes on his big, fat ass''. Even Attorney General Stone acknowledged that while Smalls ''seem[ed] to have accomplished much by his talks'', the strikers' ''operations have been resumed after he has gone''. 63 Smalls's conduct in the gathering electoral confrontation seems to have been marked by similar ambiguities. Secure in the large black majority that Beaufort guaranteed him and unamenable, at this point, 64 to ''crossing over'' or cutting a deal with the conservatives, Smalls engaged in a difficult balancing act for the duration of the strike. Outraged by Chamberlain's feeble response to white aggression, he was capable of denouncing the Governor in the strongest terms when speaking before an audience of agitated rice workers. He had responded to Hamilton's tribute to Chamberlain's ''reforms'' at Eustis Oaks by insisting that he ''did not want the republican party reformed by cleaning out every republican in it''. Contrasting the Governor's pledge to planters that he would suppress the strike ''if it took every man in the county to do it'' with his inaction after Hamburg, Smalls found the Governor wanting. Despite his resentment over the direction of the party and his incisive grasp of the disparities evident in the Governor's posture, Smalls was in the end compelled to take to the stump on Chamberlain's behalf. Of the white Charleston County Republican chair, C.C. Bowen, Democrats had written that he ''would move heaven and earth to defeat [Chamberlain] within the party'', but would ''support him if nominated''. That same predicament shaped Smalls's attitude to the approaching election. ''Although Chamberlain has done enough to make him a stench in the nostrils of every republican'', he had told an audience at Sheldon in late August, ''yet they might have to take him as the nominee of the party.'' The choreography by which he arrived at full support for Chamberlain is difficult to reconstruct. On 4 September, Smalls had declared at a mass meeting in Beaufort that Chamberlain was ''totally unworthy'' of Republican support, and under his influence a resolution endorsing the Governor's administration went down in defeat. Curiously, however, when the state party convention commenced less than a week later, Smalls was nominated to the chair by none other than Chamberlain stalwart Thomas Hamilton, with whom he had clashed bitterly over both the strike and ''reform'' policy, and whose defection to the conservatives was imminent. The Columbia Daily Register noted wryly that while ''this was regarded as a significant victory for the anti-Chamberlain party'', the ''knowing ones [:::] knew better, and said nothing''. Some clue to what was implied appeared in a separate piece concerning two other black radical delegates: ''What a laughable thing it was to see [them] abusing Chamberlain to a delighted crowd of the faithful'', when they ''both knew'' they ''would have to vote for [him]'' in the ''sham battle'' underway at the convention. 66 Ultimately, Smalls not only cast his vote for Chamberlain but applied himself to convincing the party's disoriented black base that they should do the same. His most reliable biographer contends that the ''King of Beaufort'' had been subjected to intense pressure from the national party during the period between his remarks on 4 September and the nominating convention a week later, and that he muted his criticism of Chamberlain in return for a guarantee that he would be the Republican nominee for the Fifth Congressional District. Clearly, Republican officials at all levels made strategic decisions about their attitude to the party apparatus and its program against the backdrop of an increasingly belligerent Democratic campaign, 67 and neither Smalls nor his contemporaries can be faulted for attempting to make the best of a bad situation. But the plantation laborers comprising the core of the Republican constituency, who had engaged the Lowcountry Democracy in a war of attrition, were denied the luxury of tactical retreat. Conservative restoration portended, for them, a tangible assault on their condition and status as free laborers, and that would be the case whether Smalls held onto his office or not. In spite of planters' assertions to the contrary, ricedistrict militancy was driven from below rather than above, and to the extent that Republican officials identified with the strikes, they were engaged more often in keeping pace with their constituents than in leading them.
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This seems to have been true even among minor officials with no power beyond their local communities. The conservative press insinuated repeatedly that the strikes were an outgrowth of a local Republican faction fight between the serving white Colleton sheriff, J.K. Terry, and his rival William A. Driffle, a ''prosperous mulatto carpenter''. Terry was publicly ridiculed by planters for being at the bottom of the strike, but the record suggests instead that despite his efforts to faithfully implement Chamberlain's middle-of-the-road policy, the strikers' militancy continually overwhelmed him. Complying with planter C.P. Fishburne's request that he assign a ''colored deputy'' to lead a posse that would suppress rioting and make arrests on the Ashepoo, Terry expressed frustration when a ''crowd of strikers gathered, took [ the patrician gubernatorial candidate, Wade Hampton, projected a conciliatory aura and the race-baiting former Confederate general, Martin W. Gary, undertook the dirty work of intimidation. Cognizant of the depth of the crisis in the Republican ranks and of its disorienting effect among freedpeople, Hampton pronounced himself a ''friend of the Negro'', amenable to black suffrage, while Gary orchestrated a merciless paramilitary campaign aimed at replicating the Mississippi success by suppressing the black vote. Their demographic strength offered Lowcountry blacks some protection against paramilitary atrocities, but even in the Republican strongholds of Beaufort and Colleton conservatives were committed to peeling away the radical plurality, and unsurprisingly, it was the planters at the center of the ongoing labor dispute who were most active in trying to intimidate blacks into voting the Democratic ticket. Thus, the paramilitary campaign being prosecuted by Democrats elsewhere in the state -led by mounted ''Red Shirts'' and rifle clubs -in the Lowcountry took the form of a combined operation aimed at suppressing the strike and neutralizing the district's black electoral majority. The objects of that repression -rice-laborers -responded in kind, targeting the property of prominent Democrats and inflicting the most severe punishment on strike-breakers and blacks who defected from Republican ranks.
When renewed strike activity finally broke out on the Beaufort side of the Combahee in late August it immediately assumed a more threatening character than its prelude in May. As in the earlier strike, wage reductions and the check system remained the chief complaints, but the heightened political context in which this second wave of strikes was launched made them far more intractable, and almost impossible to resolve by strictly economic concessions. One planter, noting that by early September the strike had taken hold on plantations that had always paid cash, thus asserted that the ''pretense'' that the strike had been initiated ''against the check system'' had ''now been openly abandoned''. More worryingly, reports began to filter in to the Governor's office that the unrest was spreading to ''disaffected'' cotton fieldhands some forty miles inland who, after ''holding meetings and forming conclaves'', had adopted tactics identical to those applied in the Lowcountry. The prominent Beaufort planter and Chamberlain-appointed trial justice, Henry M. Fuller, reported the outbreak of a ''formidable strike'' on 21 August, with an armed mob of 300 visiting every rice plantation. By the following day, planters had mobilized a Democratic rifle club from Green Pond and the Governor was deluged with requests to call in the navy (then stationed nearby at Port Royal) and to dispatch federal troops from Charleston. When Fuller assisted Sheriff B. B. Harris in making several arrests, their posse was set upon by a mob of strikers who In the absence of other options, the planters' penchant for taking the law into their own hands led them to embark on a coordinated deployment of white, Democratic-controlled rifle clubs. Complaints about the ''dilatory reluctance of Governor Chamberlain to enforce the laws'' began to emerge in the conservative press, and a group of planters wired the Governor in early September: ''Can't you stop it?'', they inquired. ''If not say so and we will.'' Forty whites were reported to have reached the rice fields from Allendale, and Robert Smalls, dispatched to Garden's Corner, found ''between forty and sixty white men mounted and armed with sixteenshooters, 73 Spencer rifles, and double-barreled shot guns''. Noting that there had been evident among whites ''a disposition to get up a small war'', Port Royal's Republican newspaper reported that telegrams dispatched as far as Augusta, Georgia, had beseeched white Democrats to ''come with your companies immediately'', but had been countermanded before their departure. The specter of military confrontation was brought even closer when the commanders of a number of prominent Charleston rifle clubs expressed their ''readiness [:::] to give assistance at a moment's notice'', an offer received favorably by Chamberlain. 74 And an additional ''thirty-five white men'' were reported to be encamped at Ballouville, ''waiting for the sheriff, the trial justice, the Governor, or some one else, to give orders as to what shall be done''. Like their counterparts during Charleston street clashes just days later, the rice-district rifle clubs seemed ''anxious to be called on [:::] by the authorities [and placed] within legal sanction for their action''.
Incredibly, white reaction to the strike seems to have been so excessive that it drove those fieldhands who had previously defied the ''majority'' into the arms of the strikers. Noting that a fight had broken out between laborers and strikers on the Lowndes plantation on 5 September, the Journal of Commerce seemed perplexed that while the ''whites [were] willing to protect the laborers'', strike-breakers themselves had asserted that they ''did not wish to be protected by whites against their own color''. Two days later another white rifle company ''were told by the negroes that no 'buckra with guns' were wanted; that [instead] they could and would defend themselves''. And an even more intriguing complication in relation to strike-breaking stands out in the evidence. In their frequent communications with Chamberlain, planters asserted that while there were ''[p]lenty of hands willing to work'', they had been prevented from doing so by the ''licking bands''. But in its reports on the outbreak of new strikes on the Ashepoo in mid-September, the Journal of Commerce suggested another possibility: while ''negroes [:::] make it appear that they are governed by the threat of the low country negroes'' to whip them if they worked under the old rate, the Journal correspondent asserted, it was ''known [:::] that they held a meeting on the 9 th , and agreed to demand certain wages'' themselves. evident at the Republican grassroots, along with freedwomen's disproportionate representation among the casual laborers targeted by the planters in May, helps to explain their central role in the summer upheaval.
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Although there is no evidence that women spoke from platforms at any of the numerous public mass meetings held throughout the rice district, they were certainly present -and vocal -in large numbers. Before being driven off by ''cursing'' and threats, a Charleston correspondent attending an August rally reported that of the ''600 colored men and women collected under an avenue of massive oaks'' at Sheldon, the ''women were worse than the men''. The body of 500 strikers that held a group of planters and their posse captive for three days at Ballouville in early September included ''many women [who were] especially violent, fairly howling in their rage''. Prominent in harassing strikebreakers, freedwomen played their most significant role in the effort to prevent defections of black men to the Democratic ticket. Much of their campaign was conducted within the confines of the home: Republican officials beseeched those planning to marry to wait until after their men had voted the Republican ticket in the upcoming elections, and implored those already married to Democrats to refuse to ''service them in bed''. The policy seems to have been at least occasionally effective: one Democratic strikebreaker reported that his son, who ''was to have been married in December'', found that ''on the cause of his voting the Democratic ticket the woman refused to marry him''. And freedwomen were not averse to employing more direct coercion. Ricecutter Tony Koger found himself set upon by a squad of 170 strikers, ''consisting of boys, men, women, and girls'', with ''30 whipping , 1973 ), p. 115: ''Union Reform candidates and sympathizers appearing before the congressional committee charged that in some instances the polling places were actually in the homes of Reps. Furthermore, they charged that women and children voted by proxy for sick husbands and brothers who then regained their health in time to vote themselves, and that the ballots were tampered with by the election commissioners before being turned over to the state canvassers for verification. '' women with ''hatchets and large sticks'' threatened that ''those who voted Hampton should be slaughtered that day ''. 78 Nowhere in the South did conservatives deploy the potent combination of economic coercion, physical intimidation, and material enticement against the party's ex-slave constituency as aggressively as in the Palmetto state. And yet what has struck most historians is the relative ineffectiveness of Democratic efforts and the degree to which black suffrage remained impervious, at least while Reconstruction lasted, to white Democratic management. 79 An accurate estimate of Democratic strength among freedpeople is difficult to arrive at, in part because Martin Gary's ''Plan of the Campaign of 1876'' explicitly committed conservatives to exaggerating their influence: aside from feeling ''honor bound to control the vote of at least one Negro [through] intimidation, purchase [:::] or as each individual may determine'', white Democrats were to ''begin to organize Negro clubs, or pretend that we have organized them and write letters from different parts of the County giving the facts [sic] of organization''. The Democratic press is therefore extremely unreliable: their adversaries' assertion that conservative accounts systematically inflated Democratic strength among freedmen is confirmed in recent scholarship. 80 ''Half a score of hired negroes'', the Columbia Daily Union-''Such success having attended the strike'', he advised Chamberlain, ''the planters are full of alarm, for they have no guarantee that new demands will not be made any day.'' And in this respect, his remarks were prescient. On the same day Low penned these words, the Port Royal press reported a ''renewed'' strike in the rice fields, and four days later the Savannah Morning News, complaining that the ''authorities appear to have permitted the 'union men' to have their own way'', fretted that the strikes were ''coming to be chronic''. 83 These hard-won local victories were a testament to the militancy and organizational capacity of Lowcountry fieldhands, but they paled in significance against the statewide triumph of the counter-revolution. In the most violent electoral campaign in American history, the terrorism unleashed by Democratic paramilitaries combined with massive electoral fraud to ''redeem'' the state for white supremacy and return power to conservative elites, with devastating consequences for the state's black laboring majority. Hampton's victory brought cheer to the Lowcountry aristocracy and despair to the freed men and women whose ''brief moment in the sun'' was coming to an end. With state power now firmly in their hands, planters felt assured that there would be no repeat of the massive insubordination they had witnessed in the difficult summer of 1876, when the ''richest and most productive portion of [the] country'' had been ''governed by mob law''. The planter, Louis Manigault, would recall a short time later, Hampton assumed the affairs of the State [:::] and things have on every side taken a turn for the better. After these long years of trials through which we have passed, for the first time the entire State Government is in the hands of natives of our own soil, and a bright future would appear to be in store for us, quietude and happiness resting upon the countenance of many who before could see no end to our difficulties.
sized that ''[b]eneath the race issue, and unconsciously of more fundamental weight [in the overthrow of Reconstruction], was the economic issue. Men were seeking again to reestablish the domination of property in Southern politics.'' That ''counter-revolution of property'' placed the Republican party in a difficult position. North and South, it found itself challenged from the left. In the former Confederacy the threat emanated from a hopeful and highly politicized black working-class constituency increasingly impatient with the party's temporizing. In the northern states, a resurrected labor movement that had sprung to life after the Civil War exposed the limitations of the Republican ''free-labor'' vision for broad swathes of the working poor. 85 Faced with this challenge from below, the curious alliance that had drawn together men of wealth at the North and the most destitute segment of the population at the South under the banner of the Republican party began to disintegrate. The bourgeois radicals who had led it to triumph over the slave regime now began to recoil from association with the ''laboring element'' in the South. ''The Republicans from the North are frightened by the storm they have raised'', an astute correspondent to the News and Courier gloated in a late September report from the strike district. ''[I]t has got beyond their control, and they can only smother it.'' 86 South, Montgomery observes. ''Nevertheless, the Republicans never became their party, in the sense of a party whose program and leadership were determined by black constituents '' 88 (italics in original). Reflecting on the 1876 strikes, Eric Foner has argued that ''Republican political power helped create the context within which successful collective action was possible. '' 89 While that is certainly true, the outcome of the Lowcountry upheaval suggests something further: that substantive freedom for black workers, including the freedom to organize collectively, could only endure if they succeeded in wresting control of the radical project from those Republican officials determined to forge a compromise with the old order. The rice strikes demonstrate that, aside from the planters who directed the Democratic operation in the Lowcountry, it was the destitute, mostly illiterate plantation fieldhands of the South Carolina rice district who most clearly understood the stakes involved in the critical historical juncture of 1876. Against the counterproductive attempts of the Republican leadership to win the acquiescence of white elites by a series of compromises that gutted the promise of emancipation, rice workers asserted another potential outcome which would deepen, and not forfeit, the revolutionary process detonated by Reconstruction. The real tragedy of that summer of discontent lay not in the attempt to do so, but in black laborers' inability to extend that attempt beyond the boundaries of the low country. 88 
